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WAYLAID BY A METAPHOR:
A DEEPLY PROBLEMATIC ACCOUNT
OF PRISON GROWTH
John F. Pfaff*
A

PLAGUE OF PRISONS: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MASS INCARCERA-

By Ernest Drucker. New York and London: The
New Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 189. $26.95.
TION IN AMERICA.

INTRODUCTION

The incarceration rate in the United States has undergone an unprecedented surge since the 1970s. Between 1925 and 1975, the U.S.
incarceration rate hovered around 100 per 100,000.' Since then, that rate
soared to 504 in 2009, dropping only slightly to 500 in 2010.2 In absolute
numbers, the U.S. prison population grew from 241,000 in 1975 to 1.55 million in 2010.3 Not just exceptional by historical standards, this boom is
unparalleled globally: the United States has the highest incarceration rate in
the world. Despite having just 5 percent of4 the world's population, it houses
nearly 25 percent of the world's prisoners.
It is not surprising that academics, journalists, and policymakers have attempted to explain the causes of this growth. What is surprising, however, is
the general weakness of such explanations. The formal empirical papers that
tackle the issue, for example, all suffer from severe methodological shortcomings that fundamentally undermine their results. 5 Many of the common
explanations-that prison growth is due to the war on drugs, to parole and
probation violations, to longer sentences-are often asserted with little
Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. Thanks to Amanda Geller, Dan*
iel Markel, Julian Mortenson, and Grace Tsiang for their helpful comments. Minning Yu
provided excellent research assistance. All errors are my own.
1. John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1239, 1239 (2010) [hereinafter Pfaff, Micro-Macro].
2. E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ 239808, PRISONERS IN 2011, at 6 tbl.6 (2012), available at http://
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pl 1.pdf.
3.

Id.
4. Roy WALMSLEY, INT'L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRISON POPULATION
LIST (9th ed. 2011), available at http://www.idcr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/WPPL9-22.pdf. Walmsley looks at the joint prison-and-jail incarceration rate, which for the United
States is about 743 out of 100,000 people. The U.S. incarceration rate for prisoners alone is
likely the highest in the world as well. See Pfaff, Micro-Macro, supra note 1, at 1239 n.4 (noting that China may have a higher prison-and-jail population than the United States).
5. I critically assess these empirical efforts in John E Pfaff, The Empirics of Prison
Growth: A Critical Review and Path Forward, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 547 (2008)
[hereinafter Pfaff, Empirics].
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rigorous empirical support. And as I have pointed out before, and will continue to do so here, this conventional wisdom is frequently wrong. 6 A recent
entry in this discussion is Ernest Drucker's A Plague of Prisons: The Epidemiology of Mass Incarceration in America.7 An epidemiologist by

training, Drucker attempts to use epidemiology's tools to shed new light on
the complex causal roots of today's mass incarceration problem. While he
largely fails in his efforts, he does so in a very useful way: the mistakes he
makes are ones that permeate this literature, so that identifying and correcting them serves the broader goal of setting the record straight(er) about the
causes and effects of prison growth.
Drucker makes four key points in his book. First, using New York State
as a case study, he argues that the war on drugs has been the primary
"pump" for prison growth.' Second, using the "years of life" metric that
epidemiologists employ to quantify the losses from an epidemic, he claims
that the prison "epidemic" is on the scale of the AIDS epidemic and other
major disasters. 9 Much of the rest of the book is devoted to examining how
the prison "epidemic" propagates itself through new arrests tied to the war
on drugs (Chapter Seven), the recidivism-enhancing de jure and de facto
restrictions that inmates face upon release (Chapter Eight), and the intergenerational transmission of incarceration risk (Chapter Nine). Drucker

6. In this Review, I focus primarily on the problems with blaming the war on drugs for
prison growth. In three other papers I have shown that longer sentences do not play a major
role in prison growth. See John F. Pfaff, The Durability of Prison Populations,2010 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 73 [hereinafter Pfaff, Durability];John F. Pfaff, The Myths and Realities of Correctional Severity: Evidence from the National Corrections Reporting Programon Sentencing
Practices, 13 AM. L. & EcoN. REv. 491 (2011) [hereinafter Pfaff, CorrectionalSeverity]; John
F Pfaff, The Centrality of Prosecutors to Prison Growth: An Empirical Assessment (n.d.)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Pfaff, Centrality]. In Correctional
Severity I also highlight the empirical difficulty of attributing prison growth to parole violations. Pfaff, CorrectionalSeverity, supra note 6, at 512-13.
7. Ernest Drucker is a Scholar in Residence and Senior Research Associate, John Jay
College of Criminal Justice, The City University of New York; Professor Emeritus in the Department of Family and Social Medicine, Montefiore Medical Center/Albert Einstein College
of Medicine, Yeshiva University; and Adjunct Professor of Epidemiology, Mailman School of
Public Health, Columbia University.
8. Chapter 5. Drucker's arguments on prisons start in Chapter 5. The first three chapters discuss the basics of epidemiology, and the fourth provides some background data on
prison growth in the United States since the 1970s. Drucker often refers to drug arrests as the
"pump" for incarceration, which is an allusion to a seminal nineteenth-century epidemiological study in which a doctor, John Snow, discovered that cholera spread via contaminated water
(not air, as previously thought) by mapping how cholera-related deaths had clustered around a
water pump on Broad Street in London.
9. Chapter 6. Due to space constraints, I will not discuss this point in depth. This
methodology treats the social cost of someone spending ten years in prison as identical to that
of someone dying ten years before he otherwise (statistically) would have, which both overand underestimates prison's toll. The person in prison is not dead, and thus the costs are not as
great as death. But the costs of incarceration that extend beyond the time spent in prison are
not included in this metric, nor is the fact that the "death" takes place in the earlier phases of
life, allowing significant collateral costs to accumulate in the future.
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concludes with some recommendations on how to rein in our current reliance on imprisonment (Chapter Ten).
In this Review, I focus on four major substantive errors that run not just
throughout Drucker's book but throughout the prison-growth literature more
generally. As I discuss in Part I, Drucker overemphasizes the war on drugs.
While Drucker sees it as the major source of growth, drug incarcerations
account for only 21 percent of prison growth between 1980 and 2009. Of
that growth, 67 percent comes from locking up more violent offenders (51
percent) and property offenders (16 percent).' 0 That said, the war on drugs
may play an important, albeit indirect, role (via its impact on prior convictions), but one that most commentators, including Drucker, have generally
overlooked. And as a result, he makes policy suggestions that will not reduce prison growth and misses those that might.
The second error, discussed in Part II, is linked to the first: by overemphasizing the war on drugs, Drucker underemphasizes the importance of the
rise in violent and property crime. Between 1960 and 1991-the heart of the
boom in prison populations-violent crime rose by 371 percent and property crime by 198 percent." Such surging crime rates surely played an
important role in pushing up prison populations, but Drucker never seriously
considers the relationship between incarceration and serious crime.
The third substantive error, discussed in Part III, is that Drucker treats
the criminal justice system like a monolithic entity. The criminal justice
"system" in the United States, however, is not a "system" at all, but rather a
chaotic swirl of local, county, state, and (less frequently) federal actors, all
with different constituencies and incentives. Not accounting for these jurisdictional struggles leads Drucker to overemphasize relatively minor
explanations and overlook major ones.
The fourth error, discussed in Part IV, is perhaps more procedural. In the
second (and more successful) half of the book, Drucker turns his attention to
the challenges faced by those released from, or at risk of going to, prison.
Prison inmates are drawn disproportionately from communities filled with
people living socially fragile lives, and it is inarguable that incarceration
exacerbates these frailties. Yet Drucker fails to provide essential baseline
comparisons, making it impossible to understand the marginal contribution
of incarceration. For example, he states that couples with children are much
less likely to get married if one partner has been to prison (p. 143), but he
does not adequately address how much of the disparity comes from incarceration, and such an approach implicitly attributes all the observed social
harm to incarceration. Without a better understanding of prison's marginal
contribution to these social ills, policymakers may overemphasize providing
services to prisoners rather than to the community more broadly, or they
may underestimate the extent to which the problem is one that affects
nonprisoners as well. Drucker's approach may even go so far as to confuse

10.
11.

See infra Table I.
See infra Figure 4A.
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matters of causation, attributing to incarceration broader social ills that may,
in fact, drive that incarceration (or the criminal conduct that fuels it).
A common theme ties many of these failings together: Drucker misidentifies the source of the "infection" he wishes to understand. Prison is not the
real disease-crime is the disease, and prison is but one potential treatment.
But any treatment can harm the patient when misapplied or used improperly,
perhaps even leaving the patient more vulnerable to future "illness." But by
looking at prison as the disease-as the cancer, rather than the chemotherapy-Drucker overstates the importance of the war on drugs, overlooks the
importance of violent and property crime, and overestimates the collateral
costs of incarceration.
I. JUST SAY No TO OVEREMPHASIZING THE WAR ON DRUGS

In 1980, 580,900 people were arrested for drug violations, comprising
5.5 percent of all 10.5 million arrests that year; in 2009, 1.66 million were
arrested on drug charges, making up 12.2 percent of that year's 13.7 million
arrests.12 In total, over 38.7 million drug arrests were made between 1980
and 2009 (or 9.5 percent of the total 407 million arrests). In fact, more people are arrested each year on drug charges than are incarcerated for all
crimes. These numbers certainly seem to imply that the war on drugs must
have played a major role in prison growth. Not surprisingly, many people
13
have made just this argument.
Drucker unambiguously plants himself in this camp:
What occurred in New York State to explain [its] surge of incarceration?
All signs point to a new set of drug policies, drug laws, and drug enforcement strategies-the Rockefeller drug laws [("RDLs")] of 1973. New
York's epidemic of incarceration, which continues to this day, began the
year that [the RDLs] came into effect.... In an example of what would ultimately happen across the nation, [the RDLs] proved to be the "pump"
responsible for the state's epidemic of mass incarceration. (pp. 50-51)

Drucker's core argument is justified by two figures, which I recreate (in
improved form) as Figures IA and LB below. 4 Figure LA plots the number
12.
Howard N. Snyder & Joseph Mulako-Wangota, Arrest Data Analysis Tool: U.S.
Arrest Estimates; Arrests of All Persons for All Offenses, BUREAU JUST. STAT.,
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=datool&surl=/arrests/index.cfm (queried on Nov. 5, 2012);
Howard N. Snyder & Joseph Mulako-Wangota, Arrest Data Analysis Tool: U.S. Arrest Estimates; Arrests of All Persons for Drug Abuse Violations, BUREAU JUST. STAT.,
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=datool&surl=/arrests/index.cfm (queried on Nov. 5, 2012).
13. See sources cited supra note 12. Rather than provide a long string citation here, I
will simply point the reader to a recent article by James Forman, Jr. reviewing Michelle Alexander's The New Jim Crow Era: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. See James
Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration:Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 21 (2012). Forman provides a detailed account of the numerous articles that focus solely
on drug offenses to (incorrectly) explain the growth in prison populations.
14. Figure IA parallels Drucker's Figure 5.2, p. 52; 1B, his Figure 5.3, p. 54. Drucker's
Figure 5.2 runs from 1973 to 2000, and Drucker's Figure 5.3 runs from 1980 to 2001. Drucker
does not explain why he chose these start and end dates, nor why the two time ranges differ.
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of prisoners serving time in New York prisons for drug charges between
1965 and 2008 (with a few missing years due to unavailable data), and Figure lB the share of New York prisoners serving time for drug charges.
Perhaps when viewed quickly, Figures 1A and 1B seem to support Drucker's claim that drug arrests contributed significantly to prison growth, since
they show that both the absolute and relative numbers of drug offenders rose
sharply during the 1980s; however, they do not support his statement that
prison growth in New York "has a well-defined starting point, May 1973,
when the new drug laws were put into place" (pp. 52-53), given the
decade-long gap between passage of the RDLs and the uptick in drug
incarcerations.
Ultimately, though, Drucker is wrong in at least two important waysone broad and the other narrow. Broadly, rising drug incarcerations simply
did not "pump" up prison growth, either nationally or even in New York.
Narrowly, to the extent that drug incarcerations rose faster in New York relative to the rest of the country, it is a mistake to link it simply to the RDLs;
other, more serious crime trends played material roles.
Start with the broad theory. Figure 2, which plots the annual percentage
of all state prisoners serving time for drug offenses, indicates that drug incarcerations have not been the primary engine of prison growth. While the
share rises strikingly from 6.4 percent in 1980 to almost 22 percent by 1990,
nondrug offenders always constitute at least 78 percent of all prisoners, even
in 1990, when the share of drug offenders peaked (at 21.8 percent). In 2009
15
drug offenders comprised only 17.8 percent of all state prisoners.

For completeness, I use the range 1965 to 2008 for my own Figures 1A and lB. Data are from
various years of the New York State Statistical Yearbook. The Yearbook was not published in
all years in the 1960s and 1970s (as well as for statistical year 1988), so some observations are
missing.
A quick comparison of my figures with Drucker's reveals a peculiar discrepancy: my data show a decline in the percentage of offenders serving time for drug offenses in the 1970s
and early 1980s while Drucker's show a flat line. The most likely reason for this discrepancy
is that Drucker relies on unexplained, and apparently incorrect, "estimated" data for all years
before 1980 and from 1981 to 1986, while I rely on the actual data for these years, data which
is publicly available in various editions of the New York State StatisticalYearbook.
15. Including federal prisoners, who are more likely to be drug offenders, raises the
percentage from 17.8 percent to 21.8 percent. See Table 6.0023.2011: Prisoners Under the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Prisons by Adjudication Status, Type of Offense, and
Sentence Length, SOURCEBOOK CRIM. JUST. STAT. ONLINE, http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/pdf/t600232011 .pdf.
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DRUG OFFENDERS AS PERCENTAGE OF ALL STATE INMATES,

1980-2008

Year

Given these relatively low percentages, why are people so quick to
blame drug incarcerations for prison growth? Table 1 suggests a possible
answer.
TABLE

1

SHARE OF STATE PRISONERS BY OFFENSE TYPE, 1980 AND

2009

1980

2009

%Change

% Contribution

Violent

173,300

724,300

318%

51%

Property

89,300

261,200

192%

16%

Drug

19,000

242,200

1,175%

21%

Other

12,400

134,500

985%

11%

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Prisoner Statistics (various years).

The percentage change in the number of drug prisoners dwarfs that of
violent and property offenders: it is approximately 3.7 times that of violent
crimes and 6.1 times that of property crimes. But base rates matter. In 1980,
prisons held nearly ten times as many violent offenders as drug inmates and
nearly five times as many property offenders. So while the rate of growth for
violent inmates was slower than that for drug inmates, the additional
551,000 violent offenders added to state prisons between 1980 and 2009
comprise 51 percent of the 1,068,200 total prisoners added during that time;
violent and property offenders combined are responsible for more than
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two-thirds of that growth. Including federal prisoners does not change these
results noticeably. 6
Figure 2 and Table 1 thus make it clear that the incarceration of drug offenders is not the primary engine of prison growth. Drucker's blunt claim
that "[a]rrests and incarceration under drug laws are the most important
agent of transmission that creates new cases of incarceration" (p. 80) is
simply not supported by the data. And focusing on drug inmates often diverts attention from the real sources of growth. Drucker, for example,
spends much of his final chapter discussing the need to reduce drug incarcerations, which clearly will not have the impact he hopes. 7 Furthermore,
overemphasizing drug incarcerations (and nonviolent incarcerations more
generally) may cause us to overstate the costs of increased incarceration by
understating the benefits of incarcerating violent offenders, for whom decarceration arguments are much trickier. In fact, it is by focusing on drug
offenders that Drucker may have been waylaid by his metaphor, coming to
view incarceration as the disease, not the problematic treatment of a deeper
dilemma.
That's the broad issue. I now want to turn to the narrow: despite being
wrong at the national level, is Drucker perhaps right with respect to New
York? Again, no. Drug offenders have never made up more than 34.5 percent of all inmates in New York (in 1995),18 and they had fallen all the way
to 15.4 percent in 2011.1 9 But I want to focus on a deeper problem with
Drucker's analysis, one that occurs too often in prison (and other) research.
Drucker conceptualizes the RDLs as a form of toxic exposure, which is
an acceptable methodological move. But he then makes an important error.
16. While over half of all federal inmates are serving time for drug charges, and
while the federal prison system has consistently been one of the fastest growing systems in
the country, it is still relatively small: only 13 percent of all prisoners in 2010 were in federal institutions. Adding in federal prisoners raises the percentage change of drug offense in
Table 1 from 1,175 percent to 1,321 percent, and drug offenders' contribution from 21 percent
to 26 percent. See Trends in U.S. Corrections, SENT'G PROJECT (May 2012),
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/incTrends-inCorrectionsFactsheet.pdf, for a
summary of data on federal drug offenders.
17. Chapter 10. Drucker also makes the common error of eliding marijuana arrestswith
incarceration,stating, "[W]e want to prevent as many new cases of imprisonment as possible
... especially the incarceration of nonviolent drug offenders (e.g., the millions arrested for
marijuana)." P. 167. Drucker is substantially understating the seriousness of those who end up
in prison on drug charges (particularly for marijuana charges). Eric Sevigny and Jonathan
Caulkins, for example, report that only a small fraction of state and federal drug inmates are
"unambiguously low-level": many seemingly "low-level" drug offenders are more midlevel
dealers who pled guilty to lower-level offenses. Eric L. Sevigny & Jonathan P. Caulkins,
Kingpins or Mules: An Analysis of Drug Offenders Incarceratedin Federal and State Prisons,
3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 401, 424-27 (2004).

18.

THE NELSON

OPERATION WITH THE

YEARBOOK

A.

ROCKEFELLER INSTITUTE OF GOV'T, STATE UNIV. OF

N.Y.

STATE

Div.

OF BUDGET,

1995

N.Y. IN

CO-

NEW YORK STATE STATISTICAL

(20th ed. 1995).

19. STATE OF N.Y. DEP'T OF CORR. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, UNDER CUSTODY REPORT
12 (2011), available at http://www.doccs.ny.gov/Research/Reports/2011 /UnderCustody_
ReportL2011 .pdf.
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To estimate the impact of exposure, it is essential to compare the exposed
(or "treated") group to an unexposed (or "control") group. Yet Drucker never does this-he never compares the outcomes in New York to those in other
states that did not pass equally tough laws at that time. 21 If the RDLs are
driving prison growth in New York, we should see a divergence in total and
drug-related incarcerations between New York and the rest of the country.
But when we compare New York to the rest of the country, we simply do
not see this. Figures 3A and 3B replicate Figures IA and 1B but plot New
York's results alongside those from the rest of the country.2' Both figures
undermine the link between RDLs and prison growth. As Figure 3A demonstrates, while New York's incarceration rate grew greatly during the 1980s
and 1990s, so too did everyone else's-whether they had tough New Yorkstyle drug laws or not-and these common surges in incarceration all took
place about a decade after the RDLs were passed. In fact, New York saw its
absolute and relative incarceration rates drop steadily during the 1990s and
2000s--despite making no meaningful reforms to the RDLs until 2009.22
Figure 3B tells a slightly more complicated story. First, the fraction of
drug inmates in New York prisons actually dropped after the passage of the
RDLs. It subsequently rose around the same time as that fraction rose nationwide, demonstrating the importance of using control groups. That said,
in the 1980s New York's drug-prisoner share did rise more rapidly than the
national trend, implying that something different was likely occurring in
New York. But as I argue in Part II, the key difference was not the RDLs but
New York's disproportionate exposure to crack. By focusing just on laws
and prisoner counts, and not on underlying crime trends, Drucker misses
this explanation.
I want to conclude this Section with three short points. First, the narrow
claim-that Drucker overstates the importance of the RDLs within New
York-is important for reasons extending beyond New York's borders. It is
symptomatic of a deeper mischaracterization of how the criminal justice
system works. As I explain in Part III, Drucker treats the criminal justice
system like a coherent whole: he implicitly assumes that downstream actors
will implement whatever laws legislatures pass. But that need not happen. In
New York, for example, the legislature and governor enacted the RDLs for
their own reasons, but county prosecutors ignored them for ten years, only
using them when they finally had their own reasons to do so (and, as we will
see, often evading them even then).
20. This is not the only example of criminological research failing to think clearly
about treatment and control. John Donohue and Justin Wolfers effectively criticize much of
the empirical work on the deterrent effect of the death penalty for making just this omission.
See John J. Donohue & Justin Woffers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death
Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2005).
21. Due to limitations in data availability, the national data begin in 1980.
22. There were some cosmetic changes in 2004, but the major reforms occurred in
2009. For an overview of the various reforms, see Jeremy W. Peters, Albany Reaches Deal to
Repeal '70s Drug Laws, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 26, 2009, at Al, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
03/26/nyregion/26rockefeller.html.
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Second, by focusing on drug incarcerations, analysts actually miss a
subtle but important way in which the war on drugs may significantly drive
prison growth. Relatively few drug arrests result in incarceration, but those
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arrests and convictions remain part of a person's criminal record. So when
that person is later arrested for a nondrug offense-say, theft or aggravated
assault-those prior drug convictions may lead to a longer sentence for the
index offense, or to incarceration rather than probation.
Detecting this effect is difficult. But using data from the seventy-five
largest counties in the United States, I have shown that the average number
of prior convictions has risen for defendants charged with felonies between
1990 and 2004.23 The percentage of defendants with no prior record fell
from 59.6 percent to 51.9 percent, while the percentage of those with three
prior convictions rose from 3.9 percent to 5.9 percent, and the percentage of
those with four or more rose from 7.8 percent to 14.3 percent. (The shares
of defendants with one or two priors remained flat during this time, at
around 13.5 percent and 8 percent respectively.) If prosecutors consistently
treat repeat offenders more severely, and if the war on drugs is increasing
the size of the repeat-offender pool, then the war may be indirectly driving
up the prison population in a hard-to-detect way. This suggests that it may
be more productive for reformers to focus on changing repeat-offender laws,
not drug-sentencing laws.
And third, by focusing on drug incarcerations, Drucker fails to confront
a far more challenging issue posed by the criminal conduct of drug addicts.
Drucker repeatedly argues, quite correctly, that prison is not the proper environment for treating addiction. This leads him to argue that incarcerating
drug offenders is self-defeating. 24 But that is not really the point he should
be making: what bothers him is not incarcerating people on drug charges but
incarcerating drug addicts, many of whom are serving time not for a drug
2
offense but rather for something more serious. 1 It is unfortunate that Drucker attacks the straw-man claim that people convicted of drug offenses have
driven prison growth rather than seriously engaging with the profoundly
difficult question of how to properly handle drug addicts convicted of robbery, arson, or aggravated assault-people in need of treatment who
nonetheless pose real risks to public safety.
II.

THE MISSING RISE OF CRIME

By overstating the importance of drugs, Drucker's analysis necessarily
understates the importance of other crimes. But Drucker goes further, actively dismissing any link between other, more serious crimes and prison
growth. He claims that "along with the increase in arrests [in the 1980s and
Pfaff, Centrality, supra note 6, at 27.
See, e.g., pp. 119-23.
25. Drug and alcohol use are high among criminals: in both 1997 and 2004, for example, nearly one-third of state inmates and one-quarter of federal prisoners admitted to being
under the influence of drugs when they committed the crime that led to incarceration, and
roughly half had used drugs in the month leading up to the crime. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA
& JENNIFER C. KARBERG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 213530, DRUG USE AND
STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 2004, at I (rev. 2007), available at
DEPENDENCE,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/dudsfpO4.pdf.
23.
24.
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1990s] came an increase in incarceration that ...does not seem to correspond to an increase in actual crime" (p. 92), and that between 1980 and
2001, "violent crime reached historically low rates" (p. 93). As we will
shortly see, these claims are simply-indeed, shockingly-incorrect.
Assertions about the tenuous link between serious crime and incarceration are frequently made in the literature on prison growth. 26 A partial
explanation is empirical. The relationship between crime and prison is endogenous, or reciprocal: crime rates influence prison populations, but prison
populations in turn influence crime rates. The simple regression models
used in almost all empirical examinations of the crime-prison connection
implicitly assume that such feedback loops are not present, leading to systematic and substantial underestimates of the effect of crime on prison
populations. 27 Yet more qualitative studies can be equally skeptical of the
connections between the two trends. Michelle Alexander, for example, has
dismissed arguments that crime was rising by pointing to disagreements
between two major measures of crime. 28
26. Most of the twenty empirical papers that I review in Pfaff, Empirics, supra note 5,
at 592-94, argue that the connection between crime and incarceration is quite weak. Similar
arguments can be found in sources such as Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population
Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980-1996, 26 in PRISONS 17 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds.,
Crime and Justice: A Review of Research vol. 26, 1999), and Alfred Blumstein & Allen J.
Beck, Reentry as a Transient State Between Liberty and Recommitment, in PRISONER
REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA

50 (Jeremy Travis & Christy Visher eds., 2005).

27. As a result of this error, many studies suggest almost no effect of crime on prison
size. See Pfaff, Empirics, supra note 5, at 592-94, for a general critique of these studies. The
one study that attempts to control for endogeneity reports that a one-percent increase in crime
leads to a one-percent increase in prison admissions. See Yair Listokin, Does More Crime
Mean More Prisoners?An Instrumental Variables Approach, 46 J.L. & ECON. 181, 191 tbl.2
(2003). Although Listokin's model is imperfect, it nonetheless suggests that endogeneity is a
real concern. See Pfaff, Micro-Macro, supra note 1, at 1247 & nn.15-16.
28. In the first edition of her book, Alexander states the following:
Unfortunately, at the same time that civil rights were being identified as a threat to law
and order, the FBI was reporting fairly dramatic increases in the national crime rate. Despite significant controversy over the accuracy of crime statistics, these reports received a
great deal of publicity and were offered as further evidence of the breakdown in lawfulness, morality, and social stability.
supra note 13, at 41. However imperfect crime statistics are, and even if rates of
reporting rose during this period, it is inarguable that crime went up significantly between the
1960s and 1990s. Furthermore, the "controversy" to which Alexander points is the seeming
disagreement between the two major surveys of crime in the United States, the FBI's Uniform
Crime Reports ("UCR") and the U.S. Census Bureau's National Crime Victimization Survey
("NCVS"). As many criminologists have pointed out, divergence between the UCR and NCVS
often reflects the different margins of crime they measure, not "errors" in data. See UNDERALEXANDER,

STANDING CRIME STATISTICS

(James P. Lynch & Lynn A. Addington eds., 2007).

Alexander herself apparently realized that her argument was flawed. In the 2012 edition
of her book, she revised this passage to acknowledge that despite the controversy over crime
statistics due to changing FBI methodology, "sociologists and criminologists agree that crime
did rise, in some categories quite sharply .... ALEXANDER, supra note 13, at 41. She addssurely correctly-that media accounts of the rise in crime ignored plausible economic and
demographic shifts such as cohorts of baby boomers entering their peak crminogenic years.
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Figure 4, however, makes it clear that trends in crime almost certainly
shaped trends in incarceration. Figure 4A, for example, plots national violent and property crime rates (per 100,000 people) from 1960 to 2009.
Crime surged significantly between 1960 and 1991-thus refuting Drucker's
claim that crime fell during the 1980s and 1990s. During that time, violent
crime rates rose by 371 percent (or 11.6 percent per year on average) and
property crime rates by 198 percent (or 6.2 percent per year on average).
Such increases in crime must have directly influenced prison growth from
the 1970s through 1991. If anything, the rise in incarceration appears to
have started late, nearly two decades into the crime surge; by 1977, violent
crime had already risen by 257 percent since 1960, while prison populations
had increased by only 31 percent, and had even decreased in absolute numand 1968 (and again in 1972), just as crime
ber every year between 1962
29
rates were starting to rise.
There are reasons to think that the crime boom influenced incarceration
rates into the 1990s and 2000s as well, both indirectly and directly. 30 Indirectly, fear of returning to historic highs 31likely shaped the oft-lamented
"punitiveness" of the American electorate. In fact, the crime boom may
shape punitiveness to this day. Despite two decades of steadily declining
crime, the rate of violent crime in 2010 was still 151 percent higher than in
1960, and property crime 94 percent higher-thus refuting Drucker's claim
that crime reached historic lows between 1980 and 2001. For older Americans, who are still heavily represented among voters, crime rates remain
stubbornly higher than when they were younger.

But the failure of the media to properly discuss why crime was rising has only an indirect

bearing on the degree to which that rising crime was in fact causing prison growth.
29. An important aside: Drucker only briefly touches on the question of whether increased incarceration reduces crime, and his summary is too simplistic. He states that
"criminologists now attribute a maximum of 25 percent of the U.S. crime drop to incapacitation by imprisonment. Most suggest a much lower figure of 5-10 percent." P. 109. At a literal
level, he is basically correct: the high-end estimates are around 25 percent, the low-end around
5 percent. But the low-end studies are substantially weaker methodologically than the highend estimates, since the low-end studies fail to control for the simultaneous relationship between prison and crime. See DON STEMEN, RECONSIDERING INCARCERATION: NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR REDUCING CRIME tbl.1 (2007), available at http://www.vera.org/
download?file=407/veraincarc-vFW2.pdf.
30. The following discussion is phrased speculatively because I have not encountered
articles that address these issues empirically.
31. Note that the downward trend that started in 1991 was not immediately obvious. In
1994, the observed decline could not be distinguished from the flattening that occurred in the
early 1980s, just before the late-1980s surge in violent crime. Tellingly, during the early 1990s
numerous commentators, such as John Dilulio, James Q. Wilson, and James Fox, frequently
warned about an impending resurgence in crime from a new (but ultimately unrealized) breed
of juvenile "superpredator." See JAMES C. HOWELL, PREVENTING & REDUCING JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY ch. 1 (2d ed. 2009). Fears of such a resurgence likely contributed to governments adopting ever-tougher policies during a period of (ultimately) declining crime.
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Figure 4B highlights even more strikingly the ways in which concerns
about crime may have driven prison population growth, even after crime
began declining in 1991. Rather than plotting prisoners per 100,000 people,
it plots prisoners per 1,000 violent or property crimes. Call this the "effec-
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tive incarceration rate" ("EIR").3 2 Strikingly, the EIR falls from 1960 to
1975, during the start of the longest sustained crime wave in U.S. history; it
does not return to its 1960 level until the mid-1990s. William Stuntz describes the declining E1R of the 1960s and 1970s as a profound failure of
criminal justice:
[B]y the early 1970s, punishment per unit crime had fallen massively, and
crime had risen massively, especially in increasingly violent cities. Recovering the justice system's ability and willingness to punish serious crimes
was a legitimate goal, even a social necessity .... Wherever the line is between a merciful justice system and one that abandons all serious effort at
crime control, the nation had crossed it. A turn toward more punishment
was natural [and even inevitable].33
Such political failures surely exert lasting effects; any theory of prison
growth that does not seriously account for these factors is woefully undertheorized.
Furthermore, the crime surge prior to the 1990s could have direct, but
hard-to-detect, effects on prison growth in later years, similar to those I discussed with respect to the war on drugs. States tend to punish recidivists
more severely, and the rise in convictions and incarcerations that attended
the crime surge produced a large pool of offenders with substantial prior
records. Thus consider the years 1980 and 1995: both years had roughly
similar levels of violent crime, but the offenders committing those violent
crimes likely had longer records in 1995 than in 1980. Even without any
change in penal practices, those arrested in 1995 may have been more likely
to face felony filings, be convicted of felonies, be admitted to prison, and be
sentenced longer, even though the apparent "need" for punishment was the
same in both years.
Hastily dismissing crime as a cause of incarceration also leads Drucker
to tell an incomplete story about New York's drug incarceration rate, a central focus of his causal story. Recall that Figure 3B demonstrated that the
drug incarceration rate started increasing in New York at roughly the same
time that it did elsewhere, but at an accelerated pace. Drucker focuses solely
on the RDLs, but this explanation cannot say why the increase did not occur
until ten years after the RDLs were enacted. What changed in the 1980s?

32. Note an important approximation here. The violent "effective incarceration rate"
("EIR") uses the total number of prisoners, not the total number of prisoners serving time for
violent offenses, in its numerator. Thus, the EIRs for both property and violent crime have the
same numerator. The available data are insufficiently granular to produce separate numerators
for violent and property crime EIRs.
33. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 252 (2011).

1102

Michigan Law Review
FIGURE

[Vol. 111: 1087

5

AN INDEX OF CRACK USE,

1980-2000

a

ra

19801980199018952000
Year
NatiorrlAverage

- - ---

- -

O~

Unnoted by Drucker, the rise in drug-related incarcerations occurred
roughly when crack cocaine exploded onto the national scene. Using an index of crack use developed by several economists, 34 Figure 5 compares
crack use in New York to that nationwide; the results suggest that crack hit
New York particularly hard. Some of the increase in drug incarcerations was
thus likely linked to broader anticrime tactics that sought to stem the rising
tide of crack-related violent crime in the late 1980S.1 5 In other words, the
drug incarcerations were not just the product of a war on drugs motivated
solely by political, social, or other nonpenal ends; they were closely tied to
other crime trends-some drug related-occurring at the same time.
None of this is to say that the other social factors do not matter as well.
For example, U.S. and Canadian crime rates between 1981 and 2001 moved
in very similar ways (although the level of violent crime rates has always
been higher in the United States), but Canadian prison populations remained
relatively stable, fluctuating only between 91 and 114 per 100,000 while
34. Roland G. Fryer, Jr. et al., Measuring the Impact of Crack Cocaine (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11318, 2005), available at http://www.nber.orgl
papers/w 1318.
35. Admittedly, between 1985 and 1991, New York's violent crime rate actually grew
less rapidly than the national violent crime rate (4.1 percent in New York versus 6.2 percent
annual average). See Uni(form Crime Reporting Statistics, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ ucrdata/Search/Cfime/State/StatebyState.cfm (select "United StatesTotal" and "New York" in the first column; then select "Violent crime rates" in the second
column; then select "1985" and "1991" in the third column; then click "Get Table"). But this
could simply reflect the fact that New York's violent crime rate had been-and remainedconsistently higher than the national average (by about 70 percent to 80 percent) before and
during the crack epidemic.
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those in the United States soared.36 Rising crime is thus not sufficient to
push up prison populations; other forces matter. But crime surely matters as
well, and by ignoring it Drucker arrives at a monocausal theory of prison
growth that omits critical explanatory causes.

III. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE "SYSTEM"
The third major error in Drucker's work (as well as in the work of
many others) is that it adopts an overly top-down view of the criminal justice system. Drucker assumes that because a law is passed it will be
enforced-and enforced as written. He spends no time looking closely at
how the various institutions that comprise this "system" actually interact,
nor does he examine the critical fissures of misaligned incentives that run
through this "system."
The overemphasis on coordinated action is immediately clear at the start
of Chapter Four, which opens with a somewhat shocking example of reductio ad Hitlerun: Drucker states that when we think of "mass incarceration,"
we think of "Hitler's network of diabolical concentration camps, or the vast
hopelessness of Stalin's archipelago of slave labor prison camps" (p. 38).
Such a system "seems foreign to life in our democratic society," he says, and
"[y]et the facts about current-day American incarceration are stark" (p. 38).
This is not just a one-off rhetorical flourish. He is drawing a direct connection between Fascist concentration camps and the U.S. prison system:
Incarceration ... is based on a set of laws established by any state or na-

tion to assure public safety by the separation and isolation of criminals
from society. By contrast, mass incarceration results from policies that
support the large-scale use of imprisonment on a sustained basis for political or social purposes that have little to do with law enforcement.
Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot all employed mass imprisonment .... Such

systems are often part of massive programs of slave labor or forced resetfor the first time, we see mass incarceration in a
tlement .... But now,
37
democratic society.

36. ROGER BOE, CORR. SERV. OF CAN., COMPARING CRIME AND IMPRISONMENT TRENDS
IN THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND CANADA FROM 1981 TO 2001, at 9, 21 (2004), available at http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/rsrch/briefsfb29/b29_e.pdf;

Raymond Paternoster, How

Much Do We Really Know About CriminalDeterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765,
797-99 (2010).
37. Pp. 40-41. Thus, as we can see, Drucker actually provides a much rarer reductio ad
Hitlerum, Stalinum et Pol Potum. Unfortunately, Drucker is not alone in making such extreme
comparisons. Adam Gopnik, for example, stated in the New Yorker that the six million people
currently under correctional observation in the United States are more than Stalin imprisoned
in his Gulag Archipelago. See Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America: Why Do We Lock Up So
Many People?, NEW YORKER, Jan. 30, 2012, at 72, http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/
atlarge/2012/01/30/120130cratatlarge-gopnik. Putting aside debates over how many people

were in the gulags at any one time, Gopnik's six million includes prisoners, jail inmates awaiting bail, parolees, probationers, those under house arrest, and so on. Ivan Denisovich would

not compare being on probation in the United States to being in the gulags of Siberia.
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He belabors the comparison elsewhere, such as when he compares the size
of the U.S. prison population to that of Stalin's gulags (p. 45).
Such overheated rhetoric is gravely disappointing on its own terms, and
Drucker's editors should have removed it. 38 But that reason alone would not
merit discussion if it did not reflect a deeper, and more general, problem
with prison research. Of the myriad differences between our system and
those of Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot, I want to focus on one in particular:

those systems were top-down, while ours is bottom-up. Drucker, like many
others, implicitly views the "criminal justice system" as some sort of coherent entity. And in Fascist dictatorships, it roughly is: the police, prosecutors,
courts, and prison officials work together, at least to an important degree, to
advance the regime's goals.

But the U.S. system is substantially more disaggregated, with important
implications. The criminal justice "system" in the United States is not a
single system but a melange of feuding institutions with differing
constituencies and incentives: local police, county prosecutors, county or
state judges (who are appointed or elected), state legislators elected at the
local level, and (state) governors elected at the state level, to name just a

few. And, in general, each link in the chain is fairly autonomous: prosecutors do not control the police;39 legislators and judges cannot force

prosecutors to bring charges; 4° and judges, prosecutors, and defense attor4
neys often circumvent or undermine legislative rules via the plea process. '

Governors have little control over what downstream actors do, and presidents (and other federal officials) even less. To understand prison growth,
then, we need to understand how the various actors work together. By not

examining how (or whether) this sort of coordination occurs, Drucker makes
two key mistakes: he focuses on the law as it is written rather than enforced,
and he doesn't follow the money.

38. His recommendation, in his final chapter on "solutions," that we adopt truth-andreconciliation commissions of the sort used in South Africa and Rwanda, p. 187, is equally
risible. His statement that we "need to acknowledge publicly the damage done by the excesses
of mass incarceration and see its millions of victims as the casualties of a long civil war," p.
188, is insulting to the victims of the butchery of a real civil war like that in Rwanda. It also
fails to address what we should do for the millions of victims of the crimes that sent most of
those prisoners to prison in the first place. That Drucker mistakenly suggests prison had no
effect on crime, see discussion supra note 29, perhaps led him to think that a discussion of the
victims of prison did not require a parallel discussion of the victims of crime.
39.
Daniel Richman gives a vivid account of the challenges that the New Orleans District Attorney's office, led by Harry Connick, Sr., faced when it tried to force the New Orleans
Police Department to change its practices. Daniel Richman, Institutional Coordination and
Sentencing Reform, 84 Tx. L. REv. 2055, 2059-60 (2006).
40. As Judge Posner stated, citing numerous Supreme Court cases, "Prosecutorial discretion resides in the executive, not in the judicial, branch, and that discretion, though subject
of course to judicial review to protect constitutional rights, is not reviewable for a simple
abuse of discretion." United States v. Giannattasio, 979 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1992).
See, for example, Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REv.
41.
783 (2008), discussed infra in note 42 and accompanying text.
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Start with the "law as written" point. That the legislature passes a law
does not mean the law will be enforced, at least as intended. Such is clearly
the case with the RDLs. As shown in Figure 1, drug incarcerations in New
York did not change for a decade after the RDLs were passed. Since Nelson
Rockefeller lobbied for the RDLs because drug offending was salient at the
time, the lack of an immediate response is likely not due to low levels of
offending. Instead, it appears that downstream actors-the local police and
county prosecutors in charge of enforcing the laws-did not see a need to
aggressively use the RDLs until the mid-1980s. We cannot understand how
the RDLs, or any penal legislation, matter without understanding how
downstream agencies respond to them.
And there is ample evidence that prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
judges in New York State have frequently and repeatedly evaded the RDLs.
For example, Josh Bowers, a former Bronx Defender lawyer, observed that
most participants in New York City's drug courts-90 percent in Brooklyn
and 95 percent in the Bronx-were not low-level addicts but offenders
"charged not just with sale, but with ... the highest level felony charge that
was eligible for drug court."42 The RDLs induced this strange situation: New
York City prosecutors viewed the RDLs as needlessly draconian, and so
they evaded them. For felony possession charges, prosecutors accepted misdemeanor pleas. For felony sale charges, prosecutors were either unable or
unwilling to accept misdemeanors pleas, so they used drug courts instead. In
fact, evading the RDLs partially motivated the creation of drug courts in the
first place:
As indicated by a New York State Commission (made up of prosecutors,
defense attorneys, judges, and academics) that endorsed statewide drugcourt expansion: "The courts, of course, do not write the state's drug or
sentencing laws ....The issue is thus whether there is anything-

consistent with their adjudicatory role-that our state courts can do."43
Bowers concludes that "drug courts came to welcome many drug dealers
because the preexisting sentencing options were undesirable."' Evasions
like this, big and small, surely take place all the time throughout the country.4 5 Without a rich account of institutional interactions, Drucker
oversimplifies his story to the point of being incorrect.

42.
43.

Bowers, supra note 41, at 794.
Id. at 796-97 (alteration in original) (quoting N.Y

&

STATE COMM'N ON DRUGS &

(2000), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/reports/addictionrecidivism.shtml).
44. Id. at 797.
45. It certainly takes place at the federal level: when John Ashcroft was Attorney General, fears of prosecutorial evasion prompted him to issue the famous Ashcroft Memo insisting
that U.S. Attorneys stop pleading around federal criminal law. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen. of the U.S., to All Federal Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/O3-ag-516.htm. On prosecutorial evasion
more generally, see, for example, Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Transparencyand Participationin
CriminalProcedure,81 N.YU. L. REV. 911 (2006).
THE COURTS, CONFRONTING THE CYCLE OF ADDICTION

RECIDIVISM
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The second major cost of Drucker's noninstitutional account is that he
does not address, even in passing, what could be a substantially important
engine of prison growth, at least since the mid-1990s: the budgetary moral
hazard problem posed by prosecutors. At least since 1994, it appears that
almost all the growth in prison populations has come from prosecutors' decisions to file felony charges. Crime and arrests (including those for
nonmarijuana drug offenses) are down, the probability of being sent to prison
once charges are filed has been steady, and time served has been fairly stable;
but increases in charges filed track the growth in prison admissions and total
population closely.46 And while numerous factors have likely contributed to

this behavior by prosecutors, one particularly important variable appears to be
the misalignment of prosecutorial incentives.47 Prosecutors are paid for (and

elected by) the county, but prisoners are paid for by the state. A prosecutor
thus reaps the full political benefit of each incarceration but does not have to
pay much of the financial cost-in fact, this moral hazard problem incentivizes prosecutors to send people to prison rather than jail, since jail is a county
expense as well.
Recent actions by California highlight the importance of this moral hazard problem. As part of an effort to restructure its currently unconstitutional
prison system,4 California has introduced the idea of "realignment." Under
realignment, counties will be required to incarcerate prisoners who are
called "triple-nons"-nonserious, nonviolent, nonsexual offenders-in
county jails, even if their sentences are for many years. 49 This is a direct
effort to confront the moral hazard problem by forcing county officials to
better internalize the costs of locking up minor offenders. 50
To be clear, I am not arguing that legislative enactments are immaterial.
Even if New York prosecutors effectively ignored the RDLs for many years,
they still ultimately (if not always) took advantage of them, and the RDLs

46. See Pfaff, Centrality, supra note 6.
47. See W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (On the State's Dime): How Violent Crime
Does Not Drive California Counties' IncarcerationRates-and Why It Should, 28 GA. ST. U.
L. REv. 987, 994 (2012); Pfaff, Micro-Macro, supra note 1, at 1259.
48. Due to overcrowding in state prisons, the provision of medical and mental health
care was found so inadequate as to be unconstitutional. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910
(2011).
49. See Ball, supra note 47, at 1039, 1045. Traditionally, jails have been used only for
sentences of no more than one year, with sentences of a year and a day or more being served

in prisons.
50. To some extent: the devil is in the details. Part of realignment involves the state
subsidizing counties to handle the increase in jail inmates. If not properly structured, these
subsidies could undermine much of the financial incentivization of realignment. For a discussion of the goals and purposes of realignment, see Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and
Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, and Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. (forthcoming
2013), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2133511, and CALREALIGNMENT.ORG, http://
www.calrealignment.org/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
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provided leverage for extracting pleas more generally. 5' And the passage of
tougher sentencing laws likely influences the choices prosecutors, judges,
and other actors make. But as the RDLs make clear, the impact of upstream
decisions is heavily mediated by complex institutional interactions.5 2 By
treating the system as a unitary whole, Drucker (like others) overemphasizes
legislative and gubernatorial desires and ignores the more-local actors who
are more responsible for prison growth.
IV. THE

COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF PRISON GROWTH

The latter half of Drucker's book shifts from trying to explain the macro
causes of prison growth to examining closely the collateral costs of incarceration to prisoners, their families, and their communities. He does this
partly to highlight the ways in which punishment continues even after release from prison (Chapter Eight), but also to demonstrate how incarceration
can be a self-sustaining "epidemic" (Chapter Nine). Steady employment and
a stable family life, for example, are both thought to reduce the incidence of
crime, so to the extent that incarceration increases the risk of unemployment
and divorce, it increases the risk of future offending and thus future incarceration.
And the collateral costs of incarceration are indeed extensive. Prison
weakens future employment opportunities and social capital, undermines
familial relationships, increases the risk of infectious diseases, increases the
risk that an inmate's children may experience negative life outcomes (including future criminality), and so on. And many of these risks are
aggravated by explicit state policies that limit ex-inmates' access to employment, housing, and support services. With more than 700,000 released
prisoners returning to their communities every year,53 understanding and
attacking these costs is a major public policy issue, and Drucker is right to
remind us of their scope.
Unfortunately, Drucker's analysis suffers from a significant flaw that
leads him to generally overstate the harmfulness of incarceration. Consider
the following statistics that Drucker provides about the collateral costs of
incarceration:
Unemployment among the released was as high as 60 percent one year
after release, even prior to the financial crisis of 2008 (p. 134).

51. See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Sentencing Shift Gives New Clout to Prosecutors,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2011, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/us/tough-sentenceshelp-prosecutors-push-for-plea-bargains.htmil.
52. See also the experience of Harry Connick, Sr., discussed in Richman, supra note
39.
53. Table 6.0009.2010: Sentenced PrisonersAdmitted to and Released from the Jurisdiction of State and Federal Correctional Authorities by Region and Jurisdiction,
SOURCEBOOK

t600092010.pdf.
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Divorce rates hit 50 percent within a few years of incarceration, and
unmarried couples with a child are 37 percent less likely to get married
if one partner is incarcerated (pp. 142-43).
*

Children of incarcerated parents appear to have worse mental health,
school, and psychological outcomes, and are more likely to engage in
violence and future criminal conduct (p. 150).

Taken on their own terms, these are depressing facts, and ones that sug-

gest that incarceration begets incarceration, not just for inmates but also for
their innocent children. But for each fact there is a critical piece of information missing: what are the risks for a comparable nonincarcerated
person?
Prisoners are not drawn from a random sample of Americans. They are
disproportionately poor and poorly educated, and they tend to come from
already unstable families and communities. 54 In other words, the risk of unemployment and divorce (or nonmarriage) is already disproportionately high
in the communities from which many prisoners come; children of prisoners
may be more likely to offend because of the very factors that led to their
parents' incarceration, not because of the incarceration itself. To understand
the extent to which prison is self-perpetuating, we need to know prison's
marginal contribution to these risks, an analysis Drucker does not under55
take.
And the fact is, the picture is quite muddy. Bruce Western, in a more sophisticated and nuanced analysis of prison's collateral costs, demonstrates
that incarceration does seem to significantly reduce employment opportunities--even when controlling for the challenges that those who go to prison
face in securing work before incarceration-but has no real long-run effect
on divorce or failure to marry.5 6 Regarding children, a survey of studies by
Joseph Murray and David Farrington returns mixed results: three studies
find a direct causal effect between parental incarceration and juvenile of57
fending, but two do not.
Drucker's failure to think about the baseline risks experienced by the
(self-selected) prison population leads him to overstate the marginal impact
of prison on future offending and incarceration. But again, Drucker is not
54. See, e.g., BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006).
55. In Drucker's defense, he does acknowledge this selection problem by noting, for
example, that children of inmates may be more likely to offend regardless of parental incarceration. P. 150. But he does not discuss what this concession implies about the concrete
numbers he reports, rendering it relatively uninformative.
56.

WESTERN,

supra note 54, at 126 fig.5.3, 127 fig.6.6.

57. See Joseph Murray & David P. Farrington, The Effects of ParentalImprisonment on
Children, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 133, 170 (vol. 37 2008). The Murray and Farrington study provides an important methodological contrast to Drucker's work as

well. Murray and Farrington review a wide range of studies on a particular issue, allowing
them to show the muddiness of the results. Drucker, on the other hand, often relies on a single
study, but treats its results as generally true, despite the well-known noisiness of empirical

social science research. Furthermore, many of these reports come from obscure sources or
non-peer-reviewed studies with small sample sizes.
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alone in making this sort of error. Too often in conversations about race and
punishment people point to the fact that blacks comprise 12 percent of
Americans but 50 percent of all American prisoners as evidence of racial
animus. 58 But this is the wrong comparison: the correct one is between the
percentage of all offenders who are black and the percentage of all prisoners
who are black, and blacks offend at disproportionately higher rates.5 9 Blacks

are surely over-represented even by this baseline, but not by as much as the
12 percent / 50 percent comparison would suggest. If we are to properly

understand the mechanics and implications of prison growth, it is essential
that we properly control for the numerous selection effects that shape the
population at risk of incarceration.
CONCLUSION

While Drucker's book sets out to explain the causes and effects of prison
growth in the United States, the story it tells is all too often incomplete or

incorrect. Incarceration is not a disease. Crime and the social conditions that
breed it are the diseases; incarceration is an imperfect-and perhaps at times
harmful-treatment. By treating prison as the disease, Drucker's book fails

as an explanation, although it provides a useful framework for looking at
what is wrong with our discussions of crime and punishment.
Troublingly, the errors in this book are less the exception than the general rule in the literature on this topic. Our debates over prison growth are
dominated by a conventional wisdom that, for unclear reasons, appears to be
frequently incorrect. Drucker falls into several of the biggest traps,
58. See, e.g., Jacqueline Johnson, Mass Incarceration:A ContemporaryMechanism of
Racialization in the United States, 47 GONZ. L. REv. 301, 302 (2012); Joseph E. Kennedy,
Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modem Punishment, 51 HASTINGs L.J. 829, 849, 853 (2000); Robert W. Sweet, The Judge's Dilemma: Duty or
Conscience?, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 1041, 1043 (1997). This fact is now out of date: by 2009
the percentage of state prisoners who were black had fallen to 42.6 percent. Table
6.0001.2009: Estimated Number and Percent Distribution of Prisoners Under Jurisdictionof
State CorrectionalAuthorities by Offense, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin, United States,
SOURCEBOOK

CRIM.

JUST.

STAT.

ONLINE,

http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/

t600012009.pdf. That portion has consistently been below 40 percent in federal prisons. See
Table 6.0022.2011: Prisoners Under the Jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Prisons by
Selected Family and DemographicCharacteristics,SOURCEBOOK CIDM. JUST. STAT. ONLINE,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t60022201 1.pdf.
59. Blacks are responsible for about 52 percent of all murders according to police arrest

reports,

ALEXIA COOPER

& ERICA

L. SMITH, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES,

1980-2000, at 12 (2011), and 23 percent of all victims of violent crime report that their attackers are black (although racial identifications should be viewed with some caution),
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 227669, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2008 STATISTICAL TABLES, at 53 tbl.40 (2010), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus08.pdf. Furthermore, blacks comprise 28 percent
of all arrests. The overrepresentation of blacks among violent and property offenders can be
seen indirectly by the fact that, in 2008, blacks were 38 percent of all prisoners and 36 percent
of all nondrug prisoners, suggesting that much of the overrepresentation of blacks is driven by
non-drg arrests, which are substantially less discretionary than drug arrests. See Pfaff, MicroMacro, supra note 1, at 1270 n.59.
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overemphasizing the war on drugs and missing the importance of the crime
surge from 1960 to 1991.60 He also overly anthropomorphizes our disjointed
criminal justice system and, in doing so, overlooks the principal-agent fissures and budgetary games that appear to play major roles in prison growth.
And by understating the baseline fragility of the lives led by those who go to
prison, he fails to isolate the effects that prison has on their lifecycle outcomes, thus overstating the social costs of incarceration.
Controlling the size of the U.S. prison population is an issue of substantial policy importance. But for too long our understanding of prison growth
has been weak. Without careful, reasoned, dispassionate analyses of prison
growth, we will not be able to design policies that effectively manage this
phenomenon and its collateral costs.

60. Drucker does not make another common mistake, namely arguing that prison population growth has been driven by longer time spent in prison. But this could be because he
does not address issues of time served in any depth in the book. For evidence that time served
may not be a major engine of prison growth, see generally Pfaff, CorrectionalSeverity, supra
note 6; Pfaff, Durability,supra note 6; and Pfaff, Centrality, supra note 6.

